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Introduction
A death-row prisoner spends their last twenty-four hours in a special
holding cell just feet from the death chamber. The hours comprise a flurry
of phone calls and legal visits, emergency stays granted and lifted, requests
for clemency and extraordinary judicial intervention denied, a last meal that
is hardly actually eaten, followed by the long walk (or violent drag) to the
chamber where inmates are strapped down, given last words, and executed,
usually by a three-drug injection cocktail known to cause paralysis and
searing pain before the third drug causes death. In other words, the death
penalty is a barbaric practice that seems out of place in the modern world.
Internationally, it has been mostly abolished for this reason, but several
countries have held out against this trend.
Proportionality is an ancient concept in the criminal law. It played a
central role in Montesquieu’s Sprit of the Laws1 and Beccaria’s On Crimes
and Punishments.2
In keeping with this foundational concept of
proportionality, most democratic countries have similar constitutional

* Associate Professor, University of Auckland School of Law. Grateful thanks to Sascha
Mueller, Robin Palmer, Jan Jakob Bornheim, and the rest of the law faculty at the University of
Canterbury for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Any mistakes were almost
certainly made by ignoring their advice.
1. See CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748).
2. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764).
[533]
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prohibitions against cruel treatment and disproportionate3 punishment.4
Nonetheless, in interpreting these prohibitions, countries’ constitutional and
human rights traditions have developed different definitions of “cruel” and
“excessive,” particularly in the application of the prohibition to specific
penal practices.
Within this international context of the constitutional regulation of the
excessiveness of criminal punishments, the ongoing robustness of the death
penalty in the United States stands out in stark contrast to the trend
throughout most of the rest of the world, in which the imposition of capital
punishment is largely viewed as inconsistent with international human-rights
norms.5 This Article attempts to contribute to the ongoing effort by human
rights scholars to wrestle with the mystery of the survival of this gruesome
practice in the United States by analyzing it through a comparative lens.
Specifically, this Article explores the commonalities and differences
between the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in
3. This Article uses “excessive” and “disproportionate” interchangeably, and
“constitutional” in its broadest and most generic sense.
4. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights also prohibit torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. See European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, CETS No. 5 (1953); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 5 (1948);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13,
UN Doc A/810, art. 5 (1948). The Canadian Charter of Rights prohibits cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment. See Canadian Charter of Rights, § 12 (1982) Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 12.
5. See Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection
of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
E/2000/3 (2000) (documenting the international trend toward abolition of the death penalty); see,
e.g., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, ETS No. 114, (Mar. 30, 1985); Protocol
to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, OASTS No. 73, 29
ILM 1447 (1990) (entered into force Oct. 6, 1993); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, art. 19(2) (Dec. 18, 2000) (prohibiting the extradition of suspects to
countries where there is a serious risk of facing the death penalty); The Question of the Death
Penalty, Human Rights Comm’n Rights Res. 1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
RES/1999/61; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) (holding that the
extradition of Soering from the United Kingdom to the United States for a capital offense, without
assurances that the United States would not impose the death penalty, violated Article 3 of the
ECHR because “death row phenomenon”—the psychological torture of prolonged detention while
awaiting execution—constituted inhuman and degrading treatment); Pratt v. Attorney General for
Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 364 (1994) (holding that the imposition
of the death penalty more than five years after pronouncement of the sentence categorically
constituted inhuman and degrading punishment); United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283
(Canada) (holding that the extradition of two defendants to the United States to stand trial for capital
murder, in the absence of assurances that the death penalty would not be inflicted, violated the right
to life guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms); Venezia v. Italy, App. No.
29966/96, 87-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 140 (1996) (holding that prolonged detention prior
to execution violated fundamental human rights).
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the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the prohibition
against cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment and excessive punishment
contained in Section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(“BoRA”).6 The Article focuses on the United States and New Zealand
because the text and historical English common law context of the Eighth

6. New Zealand, like the United Kingdom, lacks a unitary, express, written constitution.
See generally Philip A. Joseph, The Constitutional State, in LAW, LIBERTY, LEGISLATION: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF JOHN BURROWS Q.C. 249 (Jeremy Finn et al. eds., 2008); Beverley McLachlin,
Unwritten Constitutional Principles: What is Going On?, 4 N.Z. J. PUB. INTL. L. 147 (2006);
Matthew S.R. Palmer, What is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets it? Constitutional
Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders, 17 PUB. L. REV. 133 (2006). The rights of
a constitutional character are instead protected in New Zealand by a collection of statutes. See,
e.g., Constitution Act 1986 (N.Z.) (establishing the authority of the Queen and the three branches
of the New Zealand Government, the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary); Electoral Act
1993 (N.Z.) (establishing the basis of voting); Human Rights Act 1993 (N.Z.) (prohibiting
discrimination); Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 (N.Z.) (providing for the continued
enforcement the parts of the English common law already incorporated in New Zealand and certain
imperial enactments, including the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right); Privacy Act 1993
(N.Z.); Supreme Court Act 2003 (N.Z.); see also Treaty of Waitangi Between Maori Chiefs of New
Zealand and the British Crown [1840] N.Z.T.S. (establishing the founding principles for the
Government, citizenship, and property rights during the annexation of New Zealand by Great
Britain); New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General, [2013] NZSC 6; (“the Water Rights
Case”); Huakina Dvpt. Trust v. Waikato Valley Auth., [1987] 2 NZLR 188 (HC); Catherine
Callaghan, “Constitutionalisation” of Treaties by the Courts - The Treaty of Waitangi and The
Treaty of Rome Compared, 18 N.Z.U. L. REV. 334 (1999); Bruce V. Harris, The Treaty of Waitangi
and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand, [2005] N.Z. L. REV. 189, most notably by BoRA,
which codifies protected individual rights and freedoms in New Zealand—and customary
conventions, which together form a model of entrenched constitutionalism. See PHILIP A. JOSEPH,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 34 (4th ed. 2014) (describing
New Zealand’s constitutional conventions as “the pre-eminent non-legal source of the
Constitution”); Mark Elliott, Interpretive Bills of Rights and the Mystery of the Unwritten
Constitution, 2011 NZLR 591; see generally GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984). New Zealand is
also a signatory to several international treaties, which guarantee rights that are constitutional in
nature. See, e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), 99 U.N.T.S.
171 (1976). Because BoRA is a statute and not a formal, supreme constitution, it does not supersede
other legislation that may conflict with it. See BoRA § 4 (requiring New Zealand courts to give
effect to legislation that cannot be interpreted to conform with BoRA); see generally PAUL
RISHWORTH ET AL., THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (2003); Elliott, supra, at 593-94.
Although the courts in New Zealand will engage in a saving construction of any legislation alleged
to infringe on a protected right in order to avoid a conflict with BoRA, see BoRA § 6 (obligating
courts to interpret other statutes consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in BoRA
whenever possible), they can (but, rarely do) provide advisory opinions for the benefit of Parliament
if they believe that a statute unjustifiably infringes on a right protected by BoRA. See, e.g., Hanson
v. R., [2007] NZSC 7 at 253-54 (McGrath, J.) (explaining that “a New Zealand court must never
shirk its responsibility to indicate, in any case where it concludes that the measure being considered
is inconsistent with protected rights, that . . . there is a measure on the statute book which infringes
protected rights and freedoms”). But see Manawatu v. R., [2007] NZSC 13 at 6 (finding that the
Court had no jurisdiction to hear a BoRA claim “to interpret the legislation in a way that would be
more consistent with rights protected by the Bill of Rights”).
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Amendment and BoRA Section 9 are very similar.7 However, the two
countries’ judicial interpretations of the provisions are quite divergent,
particularly when applied to cases in which prisoners have challenged their
criminal punishments. These differences are most notable when courts in
the two countries apply the cruelty prohibitions to long sentences of
imprisonment and the practice of capital punishment.
In contrast to much of the normative American scholarly literature on
comparative constitutionalism,8 this Article is a descriptive one. It offers a
comparative analysis of the judicial interpretations of the meanings of
“cruel” and “excessive” in the United States and New Zealand. It treats New
Zealand as a lens through which to view Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
and American constitutional values,9 but it does not make a normative
argument about which interpretive culture is superior. The purpose of this
comparison is to demonstrate the way that similar constitutional prohibitions
can operate radically differently in different philosophical and legal cultures.
This Article uses New Zealand as a comparator for the United States
for several reasons. First, the United States and New Zealand have similar
legal traditions with a shared historical constitutional pedigree.10 Second,
the United States and New Zealand both have dualist systems when it comes
to their obligations under the international treaties to which they are
signatories—i.e., international treaty obligations only become binding and
legally enforceable in each country when their national legislatures have
codified them by statute.11 Third, the United States and New Zealand, both
culturally and legally, are at opposite ends of the international spectrum
when it comes to their cultural and constitutional views about the death
penalty. Most importantly, the United States remains the only democracy
and signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

7. See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 559-60 (2001) (explaining why constitutional comparison is most desirable when the two
countries whose constitutions are being compared share the greatest contextual similarities in terms
of legal systems, legal history, and social situation); see also Knight v. Florida, cert. denied, 529
U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the usefulness of comparing the Eighth
Amendment to analogous provisions of the constitutions of other “former Commonwealth nations”
because they reflected the same underlying “legal tradition”).
8. See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 7.
9. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 16-25 (1970) (explaining how comparative legal methodology can give rise to
a recognition of universal principles).
10. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (attempting to
understand the scope of the right to privacy in relation to Connecticut’s criminal prohibition against
the use of contraceptives by looking to “common understanding throughout the English-speaking
world”).
11. See infra Section II (A) (3).
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(“ICCPR”) with a robust practice of capital punishment.12 Distinguishably,
New Zealand categorically abolished its death penalty in 1989 and was the
first country in the world to sign the Optional Second Protocol to the ICCPR
(“Death Penalty Protocol”), which commits to the abolition of the death
penalty worldwide.13
Section II of this Article explores the shared historical underpinnings of
the two countries’ respective prohibitions against cruelty and excessiveness.
Section III describes the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and Section 9
of BoRA, which prohibits torture, cruelty, degradation, and excessive
punishment. It then engages in a comparison of the texts, interpretations,
and judicial applications of the two analogous provisions. It demonstrates
that the texts of the two provisions have been interpreted to encompass
similar prohibitions in theory, but, in practice, judicial application of the
provisions to specific situations—most notably challenges to the
excessiveness of criminal punishments—has been vastly different in the two
countries.
Section IV specifically explores the application of the prohibitions
against cruelty to the practice of the death penalty, which has been abolished
in New Zealand but continues to thrive in the United States: the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
notwithstanding. This section posits that the different judicial applications
of the Eighth Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA stem from philosophically
different understandings of the values that guide proportionality balancing.
It concludes that the difference between the American courts’ constitutional
tolerance of the death penalty and the New Zealand courts’ rejection of it,
stem from retributive versus utilitarian understandings of the purposes of
capital punishment as balanced against the means by which those purposes
are accomplished.
Section V addresses an obvious methodological limitation to this
comparative analysis. Because New Zealand has legislatively abolished the
death penalty, its courts’ contemporary discussions of the relationship
between capital punishment and domestic and international prohibitions
12. While many countries still retain a de jure death penalty on the books of their criminal
codes, few still actually impose the punishment in practice. See Amrita Mukherjee, The ICCPR as
a Living Instrument: The Death Penalty as Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 68 J. CRIM.
L. 507 (2004). While death sentences and executions have decreased in the United States in recent
years, they are still far from rare.
13. Greg Newbold, Capital Punishment in New Zealand: An Experiment That Failed, 11
DEVIANT BEHAV. 155, 156 (1990); see generally Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. G.A. Res. No. 44/128 (Dec. 15, 1989) (entered into
force July 11, 1991) [hereinafter “Second Protocol”], art. 1 (“1. No one within the jurisdiction of a
State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed. 2. Each State Party shall take all necessary
measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction.”).
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against excessive punishment are necessarily sparse. Section VI concludes
that the divergence in interpretations between the Eighth Amendment and
Section 9 stem from judicial philosophy and culture, rather than text, history,
or doctrine.

I. Geneological Comparison14
A. The Commonalities
1. Shared English Legal History

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
9 of BoRA share a common cultural and legal heritage. The Magna Carta
included a prohibition against excessive fines, which British courts
interpreted very early on as a broad proportionality principle that invalidated
disproportionate punishments.15 In 1688, the British Parliament enacted the
first statutory right to be free from cruel punishments in the English Bill of
Rights Act.16 This statute was the basis for the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which imports it nearly verbatim.17
When New Zealand was annexed by Great Britain in 1840, it inherited
most of its common and statutory law.18 In 1988, the New Zealand
Parliament specifically incorporated the prohibition against cruelty into New
Zealand statutory law, through the Imperial Laws Application Act.19
2. The ICCPR

Both New Zealand and the United States are State Parties to the
ICCPR.20 The ICCPR is part of the International Bill of Human Rights.21
Article 6 of the ICCPR establishes a general right to life, but contains an
14. Fontana, supra note 7, at 550.
15. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); see, e.g., Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep.
1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.) (“[I]mprisonment ought always to be according to the quality
of the offence[.]”).
16. Bill of Rights Act 1688 (U.K.), art. 10 (“[E]xcessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed[;] nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.”).
17. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 285; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976); in re: Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (“The provision in reference to cruel and unusual punishments was taken
from the well-known act of Parliament of 1688, entitled ‘An act for declaring the rights and liberties
of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown[.]’”); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d
1139, 1235 n.160 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, C.J., dissenting); see generally JOHN D. BESSLER,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH
AMENDMENT 162-80 (2012); Amy L. Riederer, Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment
through an Integrated Model of Prison Labor, 43 VALPARAISO L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009).
18. See Newbold, supra note 12, at 156-57.
19. Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, s 3 (N.Z.), § 3 (“Excessive bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
20. ICCPR, supra note 6.
21. Mukherjee, supra note 11, at 510.
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exception for capital punishment as a lawful sanction for serious crimes if it
is administered in a manner that minimizes the pain and suffering of the
condemned person.22 Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits “torture” or “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”23 Section 9 of BoRA is
derived from Article 7 of the ICCPR.
As noted above, New Zealand has also specifically ratified the ICCPR
Death Penalty Protocol.24 The United States, predictably, has not.25
3. The Role of Comparative Constitutionalism

Courts in New Zealand and the United States take similar approaches
to interpreting domestic rights in relation to these international treaty
obligations, as well as in relation to foreign constitutions. In interpreting
both the provisions of the United States Constitution and BoRA for which
there are analogous provisions in international human-rights treaties or
foreign constitutions, courts in both countries do not consider external
interpretations of those analogous provisions to be binding on them in
interpreting their corresponding domestic rights guarantees, but both
consider them to be persuasive;26 although those interpretations carry
significantly more persuasive weight in New Zealand.27
22. ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 6(2); Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 6, 12 May
2003, General Comments 6 & 20 (6). Challenges to the death penalty under Article 6, therefore,
tend to focus on the manner of execution. See Mukherjee, supra note 11, at 510.
23. See ICCPR, supra note 6, at art. 7. A similar structure exists under the ECHR, 4
November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Eur. T.S. No. 5. Article 2 of the ECHR contains a general right
to life with a specific exception for the death penalty when lawfully imposed. See id. Article 3 of
the ECHR prohibits “torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.” Id. A
specific abolitionist protocol was added subsequently. See ECHR Protocol No. 6, The Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty (Mar. 1, 1985).
24. See Second Protocol, supra note 13
25. See id.
26. See BoRA § 28 (“An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or
restricted by reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this Bill of Rights or is included
only in part.”); Knight, cert. denied, 529 U.S. at 997-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the United States Supreme Court has long treated “the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances” as “relevant and informative” but not “binding”); cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412, 419 (1908) (describing foreign wage laws as not “technically speaking authorities” but rather
relevant evidence of “widespread belief”); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
191, 198 (1815) (“The decisions of the Courts of every country . . . will be received, not as authority,
but with respect.”).
27. See, e.g., Television N.Z. Ltd. v. R., [1996] 3 NZLR 393, 395 (Ct. App.) (considering
specific exceptions in the ICCPR in determining the scope of analogous provisions in BoRA);
Simpson v. Attorney-General (“Baigent’s case”), [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (Ct. App.) (holding that the
Crown could be held directly liable for a breach of BoRA in part because of a similar requirement
in the ICCPR § 2 (3)). But see R. v. Goodwin, [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (Ct. App.) (holding that, when
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B. The Divergence

The Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution, which contains the
Eighth Amendment, predates the ICCPR by almost two hundred years, while
BoRA was enacted more than a decade after New Zealand ratified the
ICCPR. As noted infra, the Eighth Amendment was modeled after the
English Bill of Rights Act while BoRA Section 9 was modeled after the
ICCPR. As a result, there are textual differences between the anti-cruelty
provisions of Section 9 of BoRA and the Eight Amendment, which are
explored in the following section.

III. Comparative Analysis: The Extent of, and Reasons for, the
Differences Between the Two Systems
Notwithstanding their shared historical origins, the meanings of
prohibited cruelty and excessiveness in the United States and New Zealand
have diverged considerably. While there are textual differences between the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 9 of BoRA,
they are insufficient to explain the divergent judicial application of the two
prohibitions in the two countries. Instead, the bulk of the differences relevant
to this Article arise at the level of judicial application of similar doctrines to
specific penal practices.
A. The Sources of Prohibition: Text and Interpretation

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which tracks
the English Bill of Rights 1689 verbatim, prohibits the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment.28 Section 9 of BoRA, which paraphrases Article 7 of
the ICCPR, prohibits “torture or cruel, degrading, or disproportionately
severe treatment or punishment.”29
By its plain language, Section 9 of BoRA prohibits a broader range of
conduct than the Eighth Amendment for several reasons. First, it explicitly
prohibits torture, degradation, and excessiveness, in addition to mere cruelty
the language of BoRA is incompatible with parallel language in the ICCPR, the BoRA language
must be followed).
28. See U.S. CONSTITUTION, amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
29. Section 9 reads in full: “Right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment[.]
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately
severe treatment or punishment.” BoRA § 9 (emphasis added). See Taunoa v. Attorney-General,
[2007] NZSC 70 at 172 (Blanchard, J.) (concluding that “the words ‘disproportionately severe’
must have been included to fulfil much the same role as ‘inhuman’ treatment or punishment plays
in art 7 of the ICCPR”).
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(and unusualness). Second, it prohibits these types of treatment in the
disjunctive (“or”), while the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments in the conjunctive (“and”). Third, Section 9 applies to all
“treatment” that falls under the scope of its prohibitions, while the Eighth
Amendment only prohibits “punishments” that are cruel. Each of these
distinctions is discussed in the following subsections in turn.
1. The Prohibited Acts

One obvious textual difference between the Eighth Amendment and
Section 9 exists in the adjectives used to define the acts prohibited. While
both provisions prohibit cruelty, the United States Constitution limits its
prohibition to punishments that are also “unusual,”30 while BoRA explicitly
prohibits acts that are not only “cruel” but also that constitute “torture,” are
“degrading,” or are “disproportionately severe.”31
In practice, however, these textual variations have been rendered
nugatory by judicial interpretation, since the Supreme Court of the United
States interprets the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruelty to
encompass torture, degradation, and disproportionality.32 The Court has
specifically found that, when the Framers of the United States Constitution
adopted the language of the prohibition against cruelty from the English Bill
of Rights, they also adopted its proportionality principle, which prohibited
excessive punishments.33
Therefore, excessive or disproportionate
punishments are a subset of the cruelty prohibited, such that a punishment
cannot be disproportionate without being cruel under the Eighth
Amendment.
2. The Relationship Between the Prohibited Acts

Another obvious textual variation occurs in the respective uses of “and”
and “or” to define the relationship between the acts prohibited by the Eighth

30. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
31. BoRA § 9.
32. See Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281, 314 (1972)
(holding that the arbitrary application of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment and
delineating four principles for defining cruelty, including degradation to human dignity,
excessiveness, and arbitrariness).
33. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 285-86. This recognition of a proportionality principle, however,
has not been unanimous among Supreme Court justices and has sometimes been hotly contested.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961-94 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
Helm was wrongly decided and that the Eighth Amendment contained no proportionality
requirement); see generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2008).
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Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA, respectively. In the text of the Eighth
Amendment, cruel “and” unusual are used in the conjunctive, whereas, in the
text of Section 9, cruel, degrading, and disproportionately severe are used in
the disjunctive. A plain reading of these texts, therefore, might suggest that
the Eighth Amendment would permit punishments that are cruel as long as
they are common,34 but this textual variance between the Eighth Amendment
and Section 9 of BoRA has also been rendered moot by way of judicial
interpretation. In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court made
clear that cruelty, excessiveness, and societal abhorrence are cumulative
concepts.35 This interpretation has a long historical pedigree. At the time of
the founding of the United States, the early state constitutions employed
“cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” interchangeably.36
Unsurprisingly, given the disjunctive text of Section 9 of BoRA, in New
Zealand, an act need only qualify as one of the prohibited descriptors to
violate BoRA. For example, in Taunoa v. Attorney-General,37 the New
Zealand Supreme Court held that the use of solitary confinement on a
prisoner whose mental condition made the punishment unsuitable was
neither “cruel” nor “degrading,” but was nonetheless “disproportionately
severe,” in violation of Section 9.38 Conversely, in the United States, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the term “unusual” in the Eighth Amendment
as a nullity, focusing only on the question of whether a challenged
punishment is cruel (which, as indicated supra, includes torture, degradation,
and excessiveness).39
The result is that, under the Eighth Amendment, a punishment can be
unusual (in the literal sense of novel or rare) as long as it is not cruel, but it
cannot be cruel no matter how commonplace it may be.40 Therefore, by dint
of judicial interpretation, both countries’ prohibitions preclude cruelty,
34. See Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only
Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010).
35. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 243-44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966; BESSLER, supra note 16, at 118-19; Anthony F. Granucci,
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839,
840 (1969) (characterizing the language “cruel and unusual” as “constitutional ‘boilerplate’”); see
also Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions When the
Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History
and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 78 (2008). Compare, e.g., MD. DECL. RTS., art. 14 (prohibiting
laws inflicting “cruel and unusual pains and penalties”) with MD. DECL. RTS., art. 22 (prohibiting
courts from inflicting “cruel or unusual punishments”).
37. Taunoa v. Attorney-General, [2007] NZSC 70.
38. Id.
39. In determining excessiveness, however, the Court does sometimes consider the regularity
with which the punishment is imposed for the particular offense at issue. See, e.g., Helm, 463 U.S.
at 292 (including the consistency with which a punishment is imposed within and across
jurisdictions as a primary factor in determining whether it is unconstitutionally excessive).
40. But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing cruelty from
unconstitutional unusualness).
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torture, degradation, and excessiveness, separately, without regard to the
regularity (i.e., usualness) with which they may occur.
3. The Role of Punitive Intent

The clearest textual divergence between the Eighth Amendment and
Section 9 of BoRA occurs at the level of the nature of the acts that the two
provisions prohibit and their accompanying mens rea. The Eighth
Amendment only prohibits cruel and unusual “punishment,” as opposed to
BoRA, which prohibits any cruel “treatment,” regardless of whether it
constitutes a punishment. This textual distinction has become significant at
the level of judicial interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court has read the term “punishment” to
imply an intent requirement in the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment.41
In New Zealand, by contrast, while it remains a somewhat open question
whether inhumane treatment has to be inflicted for the purpose of
punishment to violate Section 9 of BoRA,42 the weight of judicial authority
suggests that the prohibition is not so limited, at least regarding the
prohibitions against cruelty, degradation, or excessive punishment.43 For
example, in Wolf v. Minister of Immigration,44 while ultimately concluding
that it was not disproportionately severe under the circumstances, the New
Zealand Court of Appeal determined that deportation was a form of
41. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (“The source of the intent requirement is . . .
the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted
is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”) (emphasis added); see also
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d. Cir. 1973) (“The thread common to all [Eighth
Amendment prison-condition cases] is that ‘punishment’ has been deliberately administered for a
penal or disciplinary purpose. . . .”); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.”).
42. Compare Taunoa, [2007] NZSC 70 at 69 (Elias, J.) (asserting that purpose is irrelevant
to the determination of whether treatment is cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe); id. at
171 (Blanchard, J.) (“All forms of conduct proscribed by s 9 are of great seriousness. . . . The worst
is torture, which involves the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental suffering for a
particular purpose, such as obtaining information. Treatment or punishment that lacks such an
ulterior purpose can be characterised as cruel if the suffering that results is severe or is deliberately
inflicted. . . . [T]reatment or punishment is degrading if it gravely humiliates and debases the person
subjected to it, whether or not that is its purpose.”); with id. at ¶ 294 (Tipping, J.) (“It is, however,
of moment to whether there has been a breach of s 9 to consider the state of mind of the party said
to be in breach. . . .”).
43. See Fraser-Jones v. Solicitor-General, [2010] NZCA 622 at 47 (noting that, unlike other
provisions of BoRA whose plain language applies to individuals who are arrested or in detention,
section 9’s plain language applies to “everyone”); Vaihu v. Attorney-General, [2007] NZCA 574
(interpreting Taunoa to stand for the proposition that the “[i]ntention to cause suffering is not a
prerequisite for a finding that there has been cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe
treatment or punishment”).
44. [2004] 7 H.R.N.Z. 469.
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“treatment” governed by the limitations of Section 9, regardless of whether
it was being imposed for the purpose of punishment.45
B. An Overview of Judicial Application

Despite judicial interpretations that largely iron out textual variations
between the Eighth Amendment and BoRA regarding criminal punishment,
in application, the provisions have very different scopes, particularly when
it comes to interpretations of excessiveness in the context of their respective
proportionality principles. Both countries’ courts treat excessiveness as a
question of proportionality: a sentence is impermissibly excessive if it is
disproportionately severe in relation to the offense for which it is imposed.
In application, however, American and New Zealand courts have very
different conceptions of disproportionality.
1. The United States

The United States is the country with the most incarcerated population
on earth.46 Between 1970 and 2010, the prison population increased tenfold,
from 200,000 to more than two million, far surpassing the increase in any
other industrialized democracy.47 This surge in incarceration was driven by
“tough on crime” policies, including lengthy sentences of imprisonment.48
45. See id. While this distinction between the two constitutional provisions—restricting only
treatment intended as punishment versus restricting all treatment that is cruel or degrading,
regardless of whether it is intended to punish—is a significant variation between the two provisions
in the context of cruel treatment that is not intended as punishment (for example, preventive
detention), it is not significant for the topic explored in this Article, which focuses on criminal
sanctions that are by definition intended to punish. Cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(holding that Kansas’s indefinite postconviction commitment scheme for sexually violent predators
did not constitute “punishment” for the purpose of the prohibitions against double jeopardy or ex
post facto punishment because it was not established with a punitive retributive or deterrent intent);
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that stripping American citizens of
their nationality as a sanction for draft dodging during World War II, in the absence of notice,
confrontation, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel,
violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the stripping of
nationality was “penal in character” because it was intended as punishment). Criminal punishments
imposed after conviction for crimes, like terms of imprisonment or the death penalty,
unquestionably fit within the scope of the “punishment” and “treatment” that the Eighth
Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA both prohibit, respectively.
46. STATISTITA RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (2019), COUNTRIES WITH THE MOST PRISONERS
PER 100,000 INHABITANTS AS OF JULY 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262962/countrieswith-the-most-prisoners-per-100-000-inhabitants/
47. See PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL
OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE 48 (2018); Joachim J. Savelsberg, Punitive Turn
and Justice Cascade: Mutual Inspiration from Punishment and Society and Human Rights
Literatures, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 73, 75 (2018).
48. See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 7 (2017).
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One factor that enabled the explosion of the prison population in the
United States is the fact that the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruelty and excessiveness as being
largely limited in practice to the regulation of the application—but not
outright abolition—of the death penalty.49 For example, the Court has used
the Eighth Amendment proportionality limitations to regulate the types of
offenses and offenders to which the death penalty may apply,50 as well as the
manner in which executions may be carried out.51
49. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the Eighth
Amendment imposed only a “narrow” proportionality principle in noncapital cases); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272–74 (1980) (explaining, in the context of Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis, that “a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of
imprisonment, no matter how long” and concluding that there was no precedent for a constitutional
limitation on the length of the prison sentences that legislatures chose to impose for felony
offenses); see Rachel A. Van Cleave, ‘Death Is Different’—Is Money Different? Criminal
Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages – Shifting Constitutional Paradigms for
Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the death penalty was
a cruel and unusual punishment when applied for the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (holding that the application of the death penalty to offenders who were juveniles at the
time of their offenses violated the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding that the application of the death penalty to individuals suffering from significant
intellectual disabilities violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that executing children who
were younger than sixteen years old at the time that they committed a crime violated the Eighth
Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that the execution of an offender
who was legally insane was cruel and unusual); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)
(holding that death was a “grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape”); Kevin M. Barry, The Death Penalty and the Dignity Clauses, 102 IOWA L. REV. 383, 40411 (2017) (discussing a line of United States Supreme Court cases categorically prohibiting the
imposition of death penalty for offenders who were insane, had intellectual disabilities, were
juveniles, or committed offenses other than murder).
51. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(characterizing burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, quartering, the rack, and
the thumbscrew as cruel and unusual punishments); Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47 (characterizing
burning at the stake, crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel as cruel and unusual punishments); see
also State v. Gainer, 3 N.C. 140 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1801) (holding that execution by peine forte
et dure (being pressed to death) violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in
North Carolina’s state constitution). The Eighth Amendment has also been interpreted to prohibit
severe corporal punishments. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Furman, 408 U.S. at
330 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]here are certain punishments that inherently involve so much
physical pain and suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them—e.g., use of the rack, the
thumbscrew, or other mont. Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of
these punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution prohibits
it.”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding that Weems’s sentence of fifteen years
hard labor in shackles for the crime of falsifying official records constituted cruel and unusual
punishment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a prison’s practice
of “handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of time” was a form of corporal
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment). Nonetheless, the Court has also rejected
multiple challenges to capital punishment claiming that the manner of execution was cruel and
unusual. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (rejecting a claim by death-row inmates that
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The Eighth Amendment does not generally place any meaningful limits
on the length or severity of prison sentences that legislatures can authorize
or judges can impose upon competent adult offenders, although the Court
has used it to limit sentences of life without the possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders (i.e., offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the
time of the commission of their crimes).52 More than twenty years ago, in
his landmark article “The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice,” William Stuntz decried the failure of the American
constitutional law to police “the content of substantive constitutional law”
and advocated for the meaningful application of a “proportionality rule” that
would bar “oversentencing.”53 This complaint is exemplified by the fact that
the United States Supreme Court has only on one occasion held a sentence
of imprisonment to be unconstitutionally excessive when applied to an adult
offender, despite several other compelling opportunities to do so.54
Otherwise, it has repeatedly upheld sentences of life imprisonment for
relatively minor property offenses in the face of Eighth Amendment
challenges.55
Oklahoma’s lethal-injection protocol created an unacceptable risk of severe pain during execution,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (rejecting a challenge to
Kentucky’s lethal-injection execution protocol on the ground that the pain and suffering that it
inflicted on a condemned inmate constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (rejecting the claim that death by electrocution was a
cruel and unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (upholding the
constitutionality of Wilkerson’s sentence of death by firing squad for murder).
52. Compare Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which precluded the consideration of mitigating
circumstances, imposed upon a juvenile homicide offender violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against excessive punishment) and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense) with McElvaine v. Brush,
142 U.S. 155 (1891) (rejecting McElvaine’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his extended term of
solitary confinement while awaiting the execution of his death sentence).
53. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). Stuntz anchors his proportionality argument in due process, rather
than cruelty under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 68.
54. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (finding that Helm’s sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for passing a fraudulent one-hundred-dollar check violated the Eighth
Amendment); Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court’s
Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 161–62 (1995). See
generally Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and
Excessive Penalties, 144 PENN. L. REV. 101 (1995).
55. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (declining to reverse as unreasonable a lower
court’s rejection of Andrade’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of fifty-years-to-life
imprisonment for two acts of shoplifting a total of nine videotapes); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11 (2003) (rejecting Ewing’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of twenty-five-yearsto-life imprisonment for stealing three golf clubs); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (upholding Harmelin’s
mandatory-minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a first
offense of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982)
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2. New Zealand

New Zealand is relatively carceral by international standards,56
although, of course, no other democracy plays in the same league of
imprisonment as the United States.57 Nonetheless, in contrast to the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, New
Zealand courts demonstrably understand the proportionality requirement
of Section 9 of BoRA to be more robust, prohibiting even relatively short
prison sentences if they are disproportionate to the circumstances of the
offense or offender. For example, in R. v. P,58 the High Court in Auckland
declined to impose any sentence of imprisonment upon an intellectually
disabled offender who forcibly raped an intellectually disabled victim in
revenge for her perceived mistreatment of his brother because doing so
would be disproportionate to the offense and, therefore, cruel in violation
of Section 9.59

IV. Application of the Cruelty Provisions to the Death Penalty
A. Divergent Values and Conceptions of Cruelty

A constitution is not simply a document that structures rights and
obligations. It is also an expression of national tradition and character. This
duality becomes evident when comparing the way that courts in the United
States and New Zealand apply their textually and historically similar bans on
government cruelty and excessive punishments to the specific practice of the
death penalty and the judicial factfinding that accompanies those
applications.
While the United States Supreme Court has found that administration
of the death penalty in specific situations or manners violates the Eighth
Amendment,60 it has consistently held that the practice of capital punishment

(rejecting Davis’s Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of forty years imprisonment for
distributing approximately nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (rejecting Rummel’s
Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence of ten-years-to-life imprisonment for a “third strike”
nonviolent property offense). This failure of the Eighth Amendment to limit terms of imprisonment
has led to radical expansion of the use of sentences of life without the possibility of parole in the
United States in the twenty-first century. Christopher Seeds, Bifurcation Nation: American Penal
Policy in Late Mass Incarceration, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 590, 598 (2017).
56. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, The Private Prison Experiments: Is There Any Positive in ForProfit Imprisonment?, SALON (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/25/the-privateprison-experiments-is-there-any-positive-in-for-profit-imprisonment/ (explaining that Australia
and New Zealand have two of the world’s most rapidly expanding prison populations).
57. See supra Section III(B)(1).
58. (1993) 10 CRNZ 250 (HC).
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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is not categorically cruel and unusual.61 The New Zealand Supreme Court,
by contrast, considers the imposition of the death penalty to be a per se
violation of the prohibitions against cruelty contained in Section 9 of BoRA
and Article 7 of the ICCPR.62
While New Zealand abolished its domestic death penalty a year before
the enactment of BoRA,63 its courts have had to address the relationship
between Section 9 of BoRA, ICCPR Article 7, and the death penalty in the
context of other countries’ requests for extradition from New Zealand of
individuals charged with offenses abroad under the Extradition Act.64 In this
61. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (holding that capital punishment did not violate the Eighth
Amendment because it served the valid penological purposes of retribution and deterrence); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (“Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment,
both on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment—and they are
forceful—the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still
widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.”); Kemmler, 136
U.S. at 447 (upholding the constitutionality of Kemmler’s sentence of death by electrocution,
reasoning that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution”); see
also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding Louisiana’s mandatory death-penalty
scheme unconstitutional, but also specifically holding that the imposition of the death penalty was
not per se cruel and unusual punishment); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder violated the Eighth
Amendment, but also specifically holding that the imposition of the death penalty was not per se
cruel and unusual punishment); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas’s guideddiscretion capital-sentencing scheme against the claim that the death penalty was per se cruel and
unusual punishment); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding Florida’s procedures for
weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases against a claim that the death penalty
was per se unconstitutional); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 355 (1995).
62. This is consistent with the consensus of most of the international community. Mukherjee,
supra note 12, at 508 (“It is widely acknowledged that the imposition of the death penalty
constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.”).
63. New Zealand de facto abolished capital punishment in 1961 and de jure abolished it in
1989. Newbold, supra note 13, at 170. Between 1961 and 1989, the death penalty was maintained
only for the offense of treason, but the punishment was never imposed again. Id. This is consistent
with the seminal work by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, which found that a sustained
period of de facto abolition of the death penalty generally precedes de jure abolition internationally.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 21–23 (1986).
64. Under the Extradition Act, before ordering an individual’s surrender for extradition to
another country to stand trial for an offence against the law of that country, the Minister of Justice
must consider several discretionary factors, including whether “it would be unjust or oppressive to
surrender the person.” Extradition Act 1999, § 8 (1). The Act specifically provides that the
Minister should not surrender the person if “there are substantial grounds for believing that the
person would be in danger of being subjected to an act of torture in the extradition country.” §
30(2)(b). The Minister may refuse to surrender the person if the person may be sentenced to death
in the extradition country. § 30(3)(a). While Section 30(3)(a) is phrased in discretionary terms,
New Zealand courts have held that the Minister should not surrender an individual who is likely
subject to death penalty abroad. See Kim v. Minister of Justice, [2017] NZHC 2109 at 113. Judge
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context, New Zealand courts have determined that both Section 9 of BoRA
and ICCPR Article 7 prohibit the extradition of individuals to another
country to stand trial for an offence against the law of that country if there
are substantial grounds for believing that these offenders would be subject
to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.65
Being subject to the death penalty in the country seeking extradition qualifies
as such prohibited treatment.66
This divergence of constitutional values is consistent with the
preexisting social-science literature around abolition. In their seminal work,
Capital Punishment and the American Agenda, Franklin Zimring and
Gordon Hawkins found that reconception of the death penalty as a human
rights issue, rather than a criminal justice issue, tends to precede its abolition,
even in the face of public support for the death penalty, in “modern
democracies.”67 In The Death Penalty, a Worldwide Perspective, Roger
Hood and Carolyn Hoyle similarly found that a hallmark of the international
evolution away from capital punishment is the emergence of international
human rights law and its commitment to “the protection of citizens from the
power of the state and the tyranny of the opinions of the masses.”68

v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998,78th Session of the HRC, 20 October 2003, U.N. Doc.
A/58/40 (Vol. Il), at 76 (holding that Canada had violated Judge’s right to life under Article 6 of
the ECHR by extraditing him to the United States without first obtaining assurances that he would
not be subjected to the death penalty there). Although the ICCPR lacks a specific extradition
prohibition, cf. U.N. Convention Against Torture, Art. 3 (1) (“No State Party shall expel, return
(‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”), the position of the Extradition Act is
consistent with the consensus view within the international community generally and the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (“H.R.C.”) specifically.
65. See Attorney-General v. Zaoui, [2005] NZSC 38; Kim v. Minister of Justice, [2016]
NZHC 1490.
66. See Judge, supra note 64, at 76–103 (ruling that States that have abolished the death
penalty could not extradite individuals to States that have retained the death penalty in an absence
of a credible assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed upon return). Of course,
because New Zealand is a signatory to the death penalty protocol, as well as the main body of the
ICCPR, it has specific obligations not to extradite defendants to countries where they may face the
death penalty from that protocol. In practice, this sometimes obscures the rationale of New Zealand
courts’ refusal to permit extradition, since such refusal could stem either from the specific dictates
of the death penalty protocol or the more general prohibitions of Article 7 of the ICCPR. Prior to
the ratification of the Death Penalty Protocol, however, many other countries had already deemed
the death penalty to violate Article 7.
67. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 63, at 21–23.
68. See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE 22 (5th ed. 2015).
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B. The Nature of Proportionality

Retribution is generally regarded as the primary basis of punishment.69
Contrary to mistaken conceptions of vengeance, retribution can function as
a limitation on permissible punishments.70 The prohibitions against cruelty
and excessiveness in the Eighth Amendment and Section 9 of BoRA are
limiting principles, in the sense that they limit the responses that legislatures
and judges otherwise could give to serious criminal conduct.
The divergent views about the death penalty in constitutional
jurisprudence in the United States and New Zealand reflect more than just a
divergence of doctrine, but rather a divergence of values and findings of
constitutional fact,71 which are reflected in the normative nature of the
excessiveness limitation. Because both countries’ courts have inherited and
continued to apply a proportionality principle in their interpretations of their
respective prohibitions against cruel and excessive punishments, the
disagreements between courts in the United States and New Zealand about
which specific punishments are (or are not) cruelly excessive must ultimately
reduce to a disagreement of judicial philosophy about whether and under
what circumstances, if any, a particular sentence is unacceptably excessive.
In the context of the death penalty, this is a disagreement about whether
a death sentence is impermissibly cruel and, therefore, what it means for a
punishment (death) to be disproportionate in relation to a criminal offense.
Because the death penalty remains in effect in the United States only for
intentional homicides, this is really a disagreement more specifically about
the disproportionality of a sentence of death when it is imposed as a
punishment for the crime of murder—the core of the traditional, lex talionis
“eye for an eye,” justification for capital punishment. The thesis of this
Article is that the competing understandings of proportionality in the United
States and New Zealand, reduce to a disagreement about the primary purpose
of punishment, generally, and of the proportionality principle, specifically—
to wit, whether it is a principle of retribution or a principle of utility.
1. Retribution

The United States Supreme Court’s continued tolerance of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment is consistent with a criminal justice
view of the death penalty and stems primarily from a sometimes
unarticulated assumption that proportionality is primarily an expressive and
69. See Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Disease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of
Punishment, in SUSAN BANDES (ed.), THE PASSIONS OF LAW (2001), at 205. But see THOMAS
HOBBES, HOBBES’S LEVIATHAN 240 (1958) (arguing that punishment should be based on
deterrence or rehabilitation rather than retribution).
70. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 3 (1651).
71. See Fontana, supra note 7, at 556 n.79 (explaining how balancing tests, value judgments
like “reasonableness,” and consequential reasoning are a form of constitutional factfinding).
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retributive doctrine.72 In analyzing the cruel excessiveness of punishments,
while it often pays lip service to other justifications for punishment
(typically, incapacitation or deterrence),73 the Court largely determines
proportionality by balancing the severity of the punishment against the
gravity of the offense for which the sentence is being imposed and the extent
of the offender’s culpability.74 In doing so, it defines gravity with regard
primarily to “the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society.”75 In
this formulation, the severity of a criminal act is a normative evaluation,
based on cultural values.76 The Court’s refusal to permit capital punishment
for individuals with intellectual disabilities or juvenile offenders, due to their
diminished decision-making capacity, are examples of its use of a retributive
understanding of proportionality, based on an offender’s lessened
culpability, as a limiting principle.77 American legal scholars similarly seem
to assume that proportionality is an exclusively retributive value. For
example, Stuntz defines proportionality as a question of “whether the people
being punished deserve the punishment they receive.”78
The divergence between the understandings of proportionality by courts
in the United States and New Zealand does not seem to occur at the level of
the gravity of the offense committed or the degree of the offender’s
72. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the concept of
proportionality was inherently tied to retributive goals); King, supra note 54, at 192
(“Proportionality can only be measured in relationship to the owner’s culpability. . . .”). See
generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
(1970); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997);
PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993). But
see Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 PENN. L. REV. 989, 1047–48 (1978) (arguing that the Eighth
Amendment establishes both retributive and utilitarian limits to punishment).
73. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty’s
penological rationale in fact rests almost exclusively upon a belief in its tendency to deter and upon
its ability to satisfy a community’s interest in retribution.”).
74. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 292 (explaining that Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis
should be guided by, inter alia, “the gravity of the offense”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (explaining
that the death penalty is unconstitutionally “excessive” if it “is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime”); see, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (extensively examining
Enmund’s lack of intent to kill and his status as an accessory rather than principal in holding that
his death sentence for felony murder was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offense); cf.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (“The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry
under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture
must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.”). See
generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987).
75. Helm, 463 U.S. at 292.
76. See Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual
Differences, 39 AMER. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 224, 224 (1974).
77. See Simmons, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
78. Stuntz, supra note 53, at 66.
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culpability. In other words, murder, torture, and sexual violation are viewed
as no less grave by courts in New Zealand and motive, intent, purpose,
deliberation, capacity, a high degree of participation, and lack of remorse no
less aggravating than they are by courts in the United States. Instead, it is in
some other aspect of proportionality balancing over which courts in the two
countries disagree.
2. Excessiveness and the Weighing of Interests

The proportionality balancing test that the United States Supreme Court
employs (the severity of the offense weighed against the retributive factors
that militate in favor of a lesser punishment) itself reflects another implicit
balance between two underlying competing interests: On the one hand, the
legitimate societal benefits and purposes to imposing punishment, in general,
and a severe punishment, in particular; on the other hand, some other,
external value that limits the range of that punishment is appropriate as a
response to the offense committed. It is, to some extent, a cost-benefit
analysis, which weighs the penological benefits of the death penalty against
its societal costs.
The divergence of understandings of proportionality between courts in
the United States and New Zealand does not seem to involve the first half of
the value balancing, the question of whether the penological objectives that
the death penalty seeks to achieve (primarily retribution and secondarily
incapacitation and deterrence) are permissible per se.79 Instead, it involves
a disagreement around the gravity of the societal and individual costs of
having a death penalty and the weighing of those costs against capital
punishment’s objectives (i.e., the death penalty’s effectiveness in
comparison to other alternatives).80 In other words, the two countries’
judicial philosophies diverge at the latter end of this balancing test (whether
there is some reason, besides the insufficient seriousness of the offense or
the offender’s culpability, to limit the severity of the societal response to the
crime) and in the balancing itself (whether the death penalty is a proportional
means to achieve whatever its positive societal ends are thought to be).81

79. This is not to suggest that these former interests—the societal benefits of the death
penalty—are not debatable, particularly deterrence and incapacitation, which are utilitarian
considerations that are subject to empirical proof or disproof. Perhaps because retribution is among
the frequently identified benefits of the death penalty, the New Zealand courts simply do not seem
to plant their flag on this particular battlefield.
80. These two factors, the weight of the interests against the death penalty and the balance of
those interests when weighed against its purposes, of course, are interrelated.
81. But see Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521,
535 (2017) (arguing that death-penalty abolition occurs when courts decide that retribution is an
illegitimate goal of punishment).
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Courts in New Zealand purport to take a more human-rights approach
to punishment, focusing on what Hood and Hoyle characterize as “a
fundamental violation of human rights: not only the right to life but the right
to be free of excessive, repressive, and tortuous punishments.”82
Nonetheless, this is not a pure human-rights focus because it entails, inter
alia, a judgment that the death penalty itself does not serve any legitimate
penological purpose, a utilitarian rather than purely retributive or humanist
consideration. The New Zealand courts take issue with the results of the
death penalty and with its use as the means to achieve its purposes, rather
than with those purposes themselves.
This entails weighing the
consequences of execution against the consequences of other responses to
the offence, rather than weighing the seriousness of the punishment against
the seriousness of the offence.
Because of this, the courts in the United States and New Zealand
disagree primarily about the necessity of the death penalty to achieve its
purported penological aims.83 This second consideration—the weight that
82. HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 68, at 22.
83. Cf. Baze, 553 U.S. at 78–86 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that
the death penalty was “patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment” in part because it served no penological purpose); Furman, 408 U.S. at 288–306
(Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment in part
because of its failure to deter crime or deliver retribution in light of its ineffective and arbitrary
imposition); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890–91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the death penalty violated the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment because
it was no more effective at achieving permissible aims of punishment than other penalties); Moore
v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 268–70 (6th Cir. 2005) (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that bias and
arbitrariness deprived it of its legitimate interest in retribution and general deterrence); People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894–99 (Cal. 1972) (holding California’s death penalty unconstitutional
under the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause of the California Constitution, in part because of
its failure effectively to deter crime), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 27 (amending the state constitution to permit the death penalty); State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1,
55–73 (Conn. 2015) (holding that capital punishment violated the cruel-and-unusual-punishment
clause of the Connecticut Constitution in part because its unreliability, arbitrariness, and bias
deprived it of any legitimate penological objective); District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274,
1282–83 (Mass. 1980) (“The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very
nature, a denial of the executed person’s humanity.”), superseded by constitutional amendment;
State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 136–41 (Tenn. 1981) (Brock, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the death penalty violated the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause
of the Tennessee Constitution because it was unacceptable to contemporary society, served no
legitimate purpose, and was “barbarous”); Ex Parte Panetti, 450 S.W.3d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014) (Price, J., dissenting) (arguing that the death penalty was unconstitutional because “the
execution of individuals does not appear to measurably advance the retribution and deterrence
purposes served by the death penalty; the life without parole option adequately protects society at
large in the same way as the death penalty punishment option; and the risk of executing an innocent
person for a capital murder is unreasonably high . . .”); Pierre v. Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1359 (Utah
1977) (Maughan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting “vengeance” as a legitimate
penological purpose); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 207–16 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (arguing that capital punishment lacked a legitimate penological

B - LEONETTI_CLQ_V47-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

554

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

4/6/2020 10:27 AM

[Vol. 47:4

should be allocated to the reasons not to utilize a punishment to achieve ends
that are otherwise justifiable penologically is what Richard Frase has termed
“ends disproportionality.”84 The courts in New Zealand also tend to give
more weight to necessity considerations—such as whether there are other
available means to accomplish those penological objectives (what Frase calls
“means disproportionality”85)—in determining whether the justifications for
the death penalty are outweighed by its costs.
Both of these proportionality objections to the death penalty are
instrumentalist and utilitarian in nature, rather than expressive or
retributive.86 As such, they evidence a more utilitarian conception of
proportionality, consistent with Beccaria’s formulation:
The purpose [of punishment] can only be to prevent the criminal
from inflicting new injuries on its citizens and to deter others from
similar acts. Always keeping due proportions, such punishments
and such method of inflicting them ought to be chosen, therefore,
which will make the strongest and most lasting impression on the
minds of men, and inflict the least torment on the body of the
criminal. . . . For a punishment to attain its end, the evil which it
inflicts has only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime.
In this excess of evil one should include the certainty of
punishment and the loss of the good which the crime might have
produced.87

V. Methodological Limitations
One obvious methodological drawback to this comparative analysis
exists because New Zealand lacks a death penalty, not because the New
Zealand Supreme Court prohibited its use after determining that it violated
BoRA Section 9 or ICCPR Article 7, but rather because the New Zealand
purpose because retribution was not a legitimate goal for criminal punishment); Arthur J. Goldberg,
Memorandum to the Conference Re: Capital Punishment, October Term, 1963, 27 S. TEX. L. REV.
493, 502–03 (1986) (suggesting that the death penalty constituted per se cruel-and-unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it failed to further the legitimate
penological objectives of deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation and because “vengeance”
was an illegitimate penological objective).
84. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–95 (2005).
85. See Frase, supra note 84 at 595–96.
86. See id. at 592; see also Grossman, supra note 54, at 168 n. 386 (describing the parsimony
principle, which requires punishment to be no more severe than necessary to accomplish its
legitimate penological objectives, as a utilitarian principle). See generally NIELS PETERSEN,
PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN
CANADA, GERMANY AND SOUTH AFRICA (2017).
87. BECCARIA, supra note 2.
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Parliament abolished it legislatively. Furthermore, because New Zealand,
unlike the United States, is a signatory to the Death Penalty Protocol, the
question of whether it is bound to abolish the death penalty is conclusively
established by its obligations under that protocol. The result of the
combination of these two factors—the political nature of the abolition of the
death penalty in New Zealand and its additional, explicit treaty obligations
under the death penalty protocol—confounds the comparative analysis
because it renders any discussion by courts in New Zealand of the
relationship between the death penalty and Section 9 of BoRA and Article 7
of the ICCPR dicta. In other words, the Death Penalty Protocol would
obligate New Zealand not to extradite international defendants to countries
where they face the death penalty regardless of whether its domestic courts
believed that its imposition violated Section 9 of BoRA or Article 7 of the
ICCPR. Those courts’ discussions of the proportionality of the death penalty
in relation to capital crimes in other countries are, therefore, necessarily
sparse and sometimes insufficiently reasoned. In addition, the rationales for
the abolition of the death penalty are already expressly laid out in the Death
Penalty Protocol, which further detracts from the depths of New Zealand
courts’ consideration of the balance between the purposes of the penalty, the
ends that it purports to accomplish, and the means by which it attempts to
accomplish them.88
Nonetheless, while the New Zealand courts’ discussion of the death
penalty are a narrower window, made from largely obiter dictum, they
nonetheless allow a partial view of the courts’ jurisprudential traditions
surrounding the death penalty. It is noteworthy that these opinions, however
sparse, do not simply say “We must refuse to extradite this individual under
our treaty obligations,” but rather clearly demonstrate the courts’ views of
the penalty of death itself as a cruel and excessive one.

VI. Conclusion
A nation’s constitution is an embodiment of its traditions, character, and
identity.89 The United States has a long (and arguably sordid) history of both
cultural and constitutional exceptionalism,90 and its approach to defining
88. See Second Protocol, supra note 13, Preamble (identifying “human dignity” and “the
enjoyment of the right to life” as the justifications for requiring abolition of the death penalty).
89. See George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1993).
90. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772
(1997) (“[T]he global transformation [of constitutionalism] has not yet had the slightest impact on
American constitutional thought.”); Clare L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue:
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 21 (1998)
(noting the refusal of American courts to consider the constitutional decisions of courts in other
countries); Adrienne Stone, Comparativism in Constitutional Interpretation, 2009 N.Z. L. REV. 45,
57; see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (“[C]omparative analysis [is]
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“cruelty” is no exception.91 The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 9 of the New Zealand BoRA share historical
antecedents and language, and both countries are signatories to the ICCPR.
However, the constitutional cultures and judicial interpretations around the
acceptable limits of the State’s right to punish, particularly by death, have
diverged considerably in the two countries.92 This divergence is best
explained not by reference to textual differences between the Eighth
Amendment and Section 9, but rather by reference to the two countries’
prevailing judicial philosophies surrounding the meaning and purpose of the
proportionality constraint on excessive punishment.
This explanation matters for anyone who wishes to see the United States
abolish its death penalty because it suggests that abolition will not come
through doctrinal advocacy alone, at least not through advocacy that fails to
account for the unique judicial philosophy of retribution employed by
American courts. Only a shift in focus from the “ends” that the death penalty
is perceived to bring to a focus on the “means” by which it achieves those
ends, particularly in light of other penological options, will move American
courts toward a more robust consideration of the acceptability of a
punishment that most of the rest of the world’s courts consider barbaric.

inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.”). See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
91. See, e.g., Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the
majority opinion holding that executing children who were younger than sixteen years old at the
time that they committed a crime violated the Eighth Amendment in part because of the world
consensus on the issue and arguing that other countries’ constitutional interpretations of their
cruelty prohibitions were irrelevant to interpreting the American constitution).
92. Cf. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889, cert. denied, (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the United States Supreme Court should find that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment
in light of the trend toward abolition “throughout the world”).

